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Abstract 
In the late '80s and early '90s, writeoffs and writedowns were used by 
managements to remove non-productive assets from the firms' financial statements. 
Writedowns allowed the firms to reduce the value of certain assets on the balance sheet, 
while writeotls completely removed the assets from the statement. The 
writeofflwritedown decision is a way to clean up a balance sheet and show improved 
,Y i 
performance in the long run. The financial markets should reward these companies (in 
terms of stock price returns), for cleaning up the balance sheet. This hypothesis is tested 
using an event study regression, and a puzzling behavior is observed. The market does 
not reward the firm for admitting mistakes, but makes it experience negative returns. 
However, these results must be interpreted with caution because of the small sample size. 
Further research with a larger sample including a complete financial ratio analysis may 
indicate results contrary to those of this study. 
-The Wealth Effects ofWriteoffs 
Introduction 
The managers of a firm like to show their company in its best light, because a 
firm with growth and profitability prospects is attractive to investors in the financial 
markets. Over time, however, mistakes are made in decision-making, and things can go 
wrong. Errors in judgement stay on the balance sheet as assets that are non-productive, 
and these investments affect firm performance. Financial analysts are better served if 
managements do not complicate financial statements, so these mistakes must be cleaned 
up. One way to do this is to use a writeoff. A write off occurs when a company 
completely removes an asset from its balance sheet. This is a loss for the firm, reducing 
the firm's assets because of the deteriorated condition of the asset. A writedown is very 
similar to a writeoff. An asset is said to be impaired when its book value is far greater 
than its market value. The difference between these two values is the writedown, which 
is removed from the asset value on the firm's balance sheet. This "clean up" on the 
balance sheet allows the firm to continue its operations and move on from the mistakes 
that have been made. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. I present a review of literature, along 
with an explanation of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, in Section I. The data and 
methodology are described in Section II, and the results of the event study are presented 
in Section III. Section IV. includes a summary and concluding remarks. 
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I. Literature Review 
A major reason to write off or write down assets (writeoff and writedown being 
used interchangeably from this point onward) is the legal ramifications for overstating 
asset value (Ragothaman, 1996, p. 32). If there is a large difference between a firm's 
book and asset value, both management and speculators cannot make truly informed 
decisions. Writeoffs allow companies to admit past mistakes, reorganize their assets, and 
move on profitably (Hutheesing, 1995, p. 107). 
Why would a firm need to either write down an impaired asset or completely 
write it off? "The primary concern of any managerial action should be its effect on 
stockholders' wealth ... " (Wetmore, 1996, p. 92). Management should always strive to 
increase the value ofthe firm. Ifa certain aspect of the firm has proven to be unhealthy 
over time, then the sick part must be made better. If it cannot be healed, it must be 
amputated. 
A writeofftakes place when management assumes the responsibility for a loss 
(Ragothaman, 1996, p. 34). To preserve the value of the organization, management must 
admit that it would be best to accept a loss to remove an unprofitable asset from the 
books (Chen, 1995, p. 57). Writeoffs are a major part of restructuring and redefining the 
company's strategy (Hutheesing, 1995, p. 106). A writeoffis top management's signal to 
the market that it is removing the money-losing and excessive costs of the business for 
the deployed assets (Bleakley, 1995). The management signals that it is going to manage 
its operations more closely and scale back business components to the strongest assets 
upon which it can build. This strategy makes the firm healthier and more attractive. 
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-The market can expect writeoffs and writedowns by recognizing the over-riding 
economic indicators for these impaired assets (Ragothaman, 1996, p. 35). The first 
indicator is when there is a reduction in plant utilization. This could indicate that there is 
a decline in long term demand for the firm's product or service, and continued decline 
makes managements think of the size of the business. Impairment can also be expected 
when there is a significant amount of new competition in the line of business, making it 
hard for a company to retain a substantial market share. A major decline in market value 
is a strong indicator that an asset is impaired, because the firm has lost money on the 
funds invested in its assets. This means that the company has put a lot more money into 
the asset than they could currently get if they sold it in the market. The other factors 
indicating that a writeoff or writedown may take place are reductions in federal spending 
in the firm's industry, and major changes in the strength of the dollar (Ragothaman, 1996, 
p.35). 
The USI;: of writeoffs became frequent during the late' 80s and early '90s. It may 
seem questionable as to why firms began using writeoffs so frequently, especially in a 
time of economic recovery. This can be partially explained by the rapid changes that 
began in technology. World competitiveness was becoming stronger. It was difficult for 
companies to keep up with the constant updating of computers and communications, 
oftentimes prohibiting pro-active measures when choosing technology. Unfortunately, 
mistakes are made in technology decisions, but writeoffs are a direct way to take care of 
them (Bleakely, 1995). 
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The otht:r possibility for writeoff frequency in economic recovery is that firms are 
trying to cover up a slowdown in earnings. A firm can use a writeoff or writedown in 
one period to make future earnings look better (Bleakley, 1995). 
The kinds of firms that seem to be experiencing the most writeoffs are in 
manufacturing mdustries (Zucca, 1992, p. 32). Manufacturing is a capital-intensive line 
of business. Ifa firm does not properly project the future of its industry, it can end up 
with unprofitable operations. This makes the entire business sector technologically out-
of-date. The industries announcing the most writeoffs (in descending order) are: 
machinery and equipment manufacturing, chemicals, petroleum refining, iron and steel 
foundries, automobiles, oil and gas, and electricity, gas, and other services (Ragothaman, 
1996, p. 7). 
Top executives must determine when to actually announce the firm's writeoff 
intentions. There are two motives for the management of a firm to time a writeoff 
announcement The first, called income smoothing, is directly related to management 
objective requirements. Many top managers are required to maintain steady earnings 
from quarter to quarter. This is to show the firm has growth prospects. On April 3, 1997, 
Roger Lowenstein wrote an article in The Wall Street Journal about corporations and 
their attempts to maintain steady incomes. Lowenstein writes that firms prefer steady 
growth for a period of time, not just in random quarters, because the markets recognize 
this stability in earnings (C 1). Lowenstein further warns that "counting pennies" from 
quarter to quatter may not be an indicator of the overall growth picture. Income 
smoothing suggests that executives will announce the firm's writeoff intentions in a 
period when earnings are significantly high, in hopes to lower immediate earnings, which 
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will "smooth ouC the earnings curve (Zucca, 1992, p. 35). This promotes the idea that 
management uses writeoffs as a tool when it is most helpful to the firm's earnings. 
The second motive is when writeoffs are recorded as "Big Baths" (Zucca, 1992, 
p. 35). A big bath is the process of admitting to a collection of various "errors" in 
judgement. Big baths suggests that management will wait until a period when a number 
of writeoffs and excessive costs have accumulated. An announcement of a writeoff 
signals management's intentions to put the firm on a path of profitability. This could 
occur in a period when earnings are already low, to show the market that management is 
purging itself of its bad business once and for all. Under this motive, the firm is signaling 
that the bad times are behind the firm and things can only get better in the future (Zucca, 
1992, p. 35). Research has shown that this explanation seems to be used most often by 
executives announcing writeoffs. 
How do writeoffs and writedowns affect the value of the firm? There are 
differing opinions on this area. Some analysts are concerned that writeoffs may distort 
the firm's earnings picture by combining all their losses into one quarter in order to make 
future earnings look better (Bleakley, 1995). Others are concerned that a writeoff or 
writedown may indicate deeper trouble because the firm at one time overstated its 
earnings (Shilling, 1992, p. 168). 
According to Srinivasan Ragothaman (1996, p. 34), the market heaves a huge sigh 
of relief when a company announces a writeoff. An efficient market knows when a firm 
is having problems and it views writeoffs as management's conscious decision to rid the 
firm of unprofitable operations. Writeoffs show that not only will these unprofitable 
activities be discontinued, but also that the company is restructuring to enhance the future 
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value of the firm (Ragothaman, 1996, p. 34). This allows the firm to use cash flows for 
other profitable activities (34). There are still others, such as Linda J. Zucca and David 
R. Campbell, who believe that there are just as many firms that do not feel these positive 
effects of writeoffs, insisting that a generalization cannot be made (1992, p. 37). Indeed, 
my results with a small sample support this conjecture. 
Although writeofflwritedown information can reach the market gradually through 
multiple sources, it seems that the stock market reacts most positively to "surprise" 
announcements in efficient markets (Zucca, 1992, p. 31). This signifies that there is a 
definite "economic impact" of asset writedown and writeoff announcements on 
stockholder wealth (Ragothaman, 1996, p. 34). This study will address this impact in 
detail. 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
The relationship between market information and stock price is examined in the 
market efficienc;y hypothesis framework. This hypothesis addresses how the market 
responds to information in terms of changes in stock value. There are three forms of the 
efficient market hypothesis because there are varying ideas as to the degree of efficiency 
of financial markets (Reilly, 1994, p. 203). These forms are know as weak, semi-strong, 
and strong form market efficiency. 
Weak form efficiency assumes the past information available to the market is 
already priced. This form assumes that stock prices reflect only the information available 
from past history of the stock price. Thus, historical data as information cannot assist in 
buy or sell decisions. This means that past information provides no signals on the future 
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performance of the firm. Students of finance, therefore, place little faith in technical 
analysis of weak form efficiency. 
Semi-strong market efficiency occurs when prices reflect all information available 
to the public. This form includes all data available from historical stock prices, the firm's 
financial statements, and the information available about the state of the economy. Semi-
strong efficiency assumes that the market has more information for decision-making 
purposes than in weak form efficiency, so the market prices will reflect the additional 
information. In other words, semi-strong markets price "new" information very quickly. 
Strong-form efficiency is the final form of the market efficiency hypothesis. 
Under strong-form, a firm's stock price reflects all applicable information about that firm. 
This includes all public, as well as private (inside) information. Strong-form market 
efficiency shows that the market is fully aware of all data and reflects this knowledge in 
stock prices (Haugen, 1997, pp. 641-644). At an extreme, proponents of strong-form 
markets believe that assets trade at true values all the time. This means that beating the 
market is impossible. 
The market is not strong form efficient if an arbitrage opportunity occurs. 
An arbitrage opportunity allows a speculator to make a profit from the market's lack of 
information efficiency. This study will examine whether or not this chance exists in 
regards to writeoff announcements. This means that an opportunity exists to earn 
superior returns than the market. Such occurrences permit investors to beat the market. 
Abnonnal returns are detected when stock prices are different from observed 
prices. In otht!r words, the stock price is predicted using the market model, and this 
prediction is compared to the actual prices on the days writeoffs are announced. 
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Abnonnal returns for the sample are accumulated to give cumulative abnonnal returns 
(CARs). Basically, the returns ofa stock in the sample are regressed against the returns 
of a benchmark (the S&P 500 index). Using this model, I predict stock prices for a 5-day 
period around the day of the announcement. I now compare the predicted return with the 
actual return that took place within this II-day window. 
II. Data and :Methodology 
Data for this study were obtained from the Wall Street Journal Index. 
Specifically, I Iooked for all writeoff and write down announcements. The companies' 
CUSIPs (directly related to the Standard Industrial Classification code, or SIC code), 
ticker symbols, and Chicago Research and Security Prices (CRSP) Pennanent database 
numbers are used for identification purposes. The CRSP database contains prices, 
dividends, and market index infonnation for all companies trading on the stock exchange 
on a daily basis from 1962 onward. The dates are identified for which data are available 
on the CRSP daily returns file. From the 95 companies found, a sample of 19 companies 
was taken. Complete data were found for 16 finns, and the analysis was perfonned on 
these 16 companies. 
The methodological approach used for this paper is in the fonn of an event study. 
This abnonnal perfonnance index test analyzes the security price behavior around the 
time of an event or informational announcement (Bowman, 1983, p. 561). A regression 
will be perforrned against the market return to evaluate the effects a writeoff 
announcement has on the firm's stock price. The study will analyze stock return changes 
both before and after the announcement. 
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The market model is estimated for each firm in the sample for 95 days prior to the 
event, with a window for abnormal returns of 5 days around the event. The market model 
is described as: 
Where, 
rit = return on stock I on day t 
rmt = return on the S&P 500 index from CRSP on day t 
ai, l3i = market model coefficients 
eit = disturbance term 
The coefficients are obtained using ordinary least squares. The 'abnormal returns' are 
computed for each firm: 
Where ai and bi are OLS estimates of Uj and l3i. 
The regression helps us predict share prices in the II-day window. The abnormal 
return is calculated by comparing the predicted and the actual return. Once abnormal 
returns are computed for each firm, they are added to get abnormal returns for each day. 
Abnormal returns are summed across the days to get the cumulative abnormal returns. 
ID. Results 
Three different windows are examined in this study (Please see Table 1, p. 12). 
The first window consists of the returns for day -5 until day -2. In the three days prior to 
the event (the announcement in this case), the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) show 
no abnormal patterns. In the second window, the reaction the day before (day -1) and the 
day of the announcement (day 0) produces an abnormal return of -2.34%, which is 
statistically significant. This means that the market seems to be aware of the firm's 
signal. The price changes in these two days are different from 'normal' trading. This is 
9 
-anomalous behavior, permitting an investor to seek such events, trade on this 
information, and beat the market. 
For the fi)UT days after the announcement (day 1 through day 5), there is no 
reaction, and one must assume that the event is assimilated in the stock price. In other 
words, the mark,et is astute enough to react to the information. There is no sign of 
ingenious trading because of the absence of cumulative abnormal returns. 
Surprisingly, my sample detects a negative return. This means that financial 
markets do not reward firm management for cleaning up the balance sheet. This puzzling 
reaction will require further analysis. Continued work must focus on changes in the 
companies' financial ratios. An extended examination will provide answers to this 
anomaly. 
Figure I (See p. 13) shows the cumulative abnormal returns over the II-day 
window. The different event windows document the price changes of writeoff 
announcements, and the graph provides a very clear picture of what is happening. For 
my sample, the price of shares continues falling before and after the announcement. This 
means that financial markets are not 'happy' with such writeoff announcements. One 
conjecture for this is that the investors are unhappy at the thought that their management 
has actually made mistakes. 
The results to this study are preliminary, due to the small sample size, but the test 
is a good beginning to examine the effects ofwriteoffs on corporations. However, the 
conclusions should be read with care. Given the complete sample, the analysis will likely 
provide results that could either augment or refute my findings. 
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IV. Conclusion 
A writeoff is a management tool used to rid a firm of unprofitable business 
activities. These activities can include business units that are no longer realizing 
earnings, or assets that are so severely undervalued in the market that it is not prudent for 
the firm to hold them on the books. Writeoffs and writedowns allow a company to accept 
a current loss so that the firm can continue profitably. The underlying idea is that a firm 
admits past mistakes, and moves on toward the future. 
This study shows, through decreased stock value, that the market is really 
reprimanding the management's efforts to clean up the balance sheet. This reaction is 
puzzling, but could be because I have a small sample, and thus these results are 
preliminary, at best. The complete sample will provide more illuminating results. Also, 
further work must focus on the financial performance of the firms, both before and after 
the writeoff announcements, before stronger conclusions can be made. 
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Table 1. 
Abnormal Returns for the Writeoff Sample 
Average 
Compounded 
Days Abnormal Return t Positive: Negative 
( -5,-2) -0.40% -0.43 9:9 
(-1,0) -2.34% -3.49*** 5:13 
(+ 1,+5) -1.14% -1.08 6:12 
n=16 
***, significant at .001 
-
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Figure 1. 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
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